Ensuring secure information ow within programs in the context of multiple sensitivity levels has been widely studied. Especially noteworthy is Denning's work in secure ow analysis and the lattice model 6] 7]. Until now, however, the soundness of Denning's analysis has not been established satisfactorily. We formulate Denning's approach as a type system and present a notion of soundness for the system that can be viewed as a form of noninterference. Soundness is established by proving, with respect to a standard programming language semantics, that all well-typed programs have this noninterference property.
Introduction
The problem of ensuring secure information ow within systems having multiple sensitivity levels has been studied extensively, beginning with the early work of Bell and LaPadula 3] . This was extended by the lattice-model work of Denning 5 ] 6] 7] who pioneered program certi cation, an e cient form of static analysis that could be easily incorporated into a compiler to verify secure information ow in programs. Denning's analysis has been characterized as an extension of an axiomatic logic for program correctness by Andrews So far there has not been a satisfactory treatment of the soundness of Denning's analysis. After all, we want to be assured that if the analysis succeeds for a given program on some inputs, then the program in some sense executes securely. Denning provides intuitive arguments only in 7] 8]. Although a more rigorous account of information ow in terms of classical information theory is given in 8], no formal soundness proof is attempted. Andrews and Reitman 1] do not address the soundness of their ow logic at all. Soundness is considered in rb k 18], but the treatment depends on an \instrumented semantics" where every value is tagged with a security class. These classes are updated for values at run time according to Denning's certi cation conditions. A similar approach is taken by Mizuno and Schmidt 17] . However, these approaches are unsatisfactory. By modifying the semantics in this way, there is no longer any basis for justifying the soundness of the analysis. Proving soundness in this framework essentially amounts to proving that the analysis is consistent with the instrumented semantics. But then it is fair to ask whether class tags are updated correctly in the instrumented semantics. There is no justi cation for tag manipulation in the semantics.
We take a type-based approach to the analysis. The certi cation conditions of Denning's analysis 7] 8] are formulated as a simple type system for a deterministic language. A type system is basically a formal system of type inference rules for making judgments about programs. They are usually used to establish the type correctness of programs in a strongly-typed language, for example, Standard ML 20] . However, they are not limited to reasoning about traditional forms of type correctness. They can be regarded, in general, as logical systems in which to reason about a wide variety of program properties. In our case, the property of interest is secure information ow.
Characterizing the analysis as a type system has many advantages. It serves as a formal speci cation that cleanly separates the security policies from the algorithms for enforcing them in programs. The separation also admits a notion of soundness for the analysis that resembles traditional noninterference 9]. Intuitively, soundness states that variables in a well-typed program do not \interfere" with variables at lower security levels. This is formalized as a type soundness theorem and proved. It is interesting to point out that the soundness proof justi es a more exible treatment of local variables|in some cases, there is an implicit ow to a local variable, but the ow is actually harmless, so it need not be rejected. The secure ow typing rules merge some traditional type correctness concerns with secure-ow enforcement. Upward information ows are easily accommodated through subtyping. And nally, though not addressed in this paper, the type system can be automated, using standard type inference techniques, to analyze programs for secure ows.
We begin with an overview of Denning's lattice model followed by an informal treatment of the type system. Examples are given to show how the typing rules are used. Then we turn our attention to a formal treatment of the type system and prove a soundness theorem with respect to a standard semantics for the language. Other soundness e orts will then be discussed along with language extensions and some directions for future research.
A Sound Type System for Secure Flow Analysis 
The Lattice Model of Information Flow
The lattice model is an extension of the Bell and LaPadula model 3]. In this model, an information ow policy is de ned by a lattice (SC; ), where SC is a nite set of security classes partially ordered by . SC may include secrecy classes, like low (L) and high (H ), as well as integrity classes, like trusted (T) and untrusted (U ), where L H and T U . There may be combinations of them as well, like HT.
Every program variable x has a security class denoted by x. It is assumed that x can be determined statically and that it does not vary at run time. If x and y are variables and there is a ow of information from x to y then it is a permissible ow i x y.
Every programming construct has a certi cation condition. It is a purely syntactic condition relating security classes. Some of these conditions control explicit ows while others control implicit ows. For example, the statement y := x has the condition x y, that is, the ow of information from the security class of x to that of y must be permitted by the ow policy. This is an example of a condition controlling an explicit ow. The conditions for other constructs, such as if statements and while loops, control implicit ows. For example, there is always an implicit ow from the guard of a conditional to its branches. For instance, in the statement if x > y then z := w else i := i + 1 there is an implicit ow from x and y to z and i. So the statement has the certi cation condition x y z i where and denote least upper bound and greatest lower bound operators respectively. The lattice property makes it possible to enforce these conditions using a simple attribute grammar with synthesized attributes only.
An Informal Treatment of the Type System
A type system consists of a set of inference rules and axioms for deriving typing judgments. A typing judgment, for our purposes, has the form `p :
This judgment asserts that program (or program phrase) p has type with respect to identi er typing . An identi er typing is a map from identi ers to types; it gives the types of any free identi ers of p. A judgment follows from the type system if it is the last in a sequence of judgments where each judgment in the sequence is an axiom or one that follows from preceding judgments by a type inference rule.
For `z + 1 : int is a judgment that follows from the type system. We say z + 1 is well typed with respect to in this case and that it has type int. But if (z) = bool then the judgment no longer follows from the system and we say z +1 is not well typed with respect to . The preceding example illustrates a traditional type system. Our secure ow type system is also composed of types and type inference rules, but now the rules enforce secure ow as opposed to data type compatibility. The rules allow secureow judgments to be made for expressions and commands in a block-structured, deterministic language.
Secure Flow Types
The types of our system are strati ed into two levels. At one level are the data types, denoted by , which are the security classes of SC . We assume that SC is partially ordered by . At the other level are the phrase types, denoted by . These include data types, which are the types given to expressions, variable types of the form var, and command types of the form cmd. As one would expect, a variable of type var stores information whose security class is or lower. More novelly, a command c has type cmd only if it is guaranteed that every assignment within c is made to a variable whose security class is or higher. This is a con nement property, needed to ensure secure implicit ows. We extend the partial order to a subtype relation which we denote . The subtype relation is antimonotonic (or contravariant) in the types of commands, meaning that if 0 then 0 cmd cmd. As usual, there is a type coercion rule that allows a phrase of type to be assigned a type 0 whenever 0 .
Secure Flow Typing Rules
The typing rules guarantee secure explicit and implicit ows as do certi cation rules in the lattice model. Consider, for example, the typing rule for assignment:
`e : var; `e 0 : `e := e 0 : cmd This rule essentially says that in order to ensure that the explicit ow from e 0 to e is secure, e 0 and e must agree on their security levels, which is conveyed by appearing in both hypotheses of the rule. Note, however, that an upward ow from e 0 to e is still allowed; if e : H var and e 0 : L, then with subtyping, the type of e 0 can be coerced up to H and the rule applied with = H. 1 Notice that in the preceding typing rule, the entire assignment is given type cmd. The reason for this is to control implicit ows. Here is a simple example. Suppose x is either 0 or 1 and consider if x = 1 then y := 1 else y := 0
Although there is no explicit ow from x to y, there is an implicit ow because x is indirectly copied to y. To ensure that such implicit ows are secure, we use the following typing rule for conditionals:
`e : ; `c : cmd; `c 0 : cmd `if e then c else c 0 : cmd The intuition behind the rule is that c and c 0 are executed in a context where information of level is implicitly known. For this reason, c and c 0 may only assign to variables of level or higher. Although the rule requires the guard e and branches c and c 0 to have the same security level, namely , it does not prevent an implicit upward ow from e to branches c and c 0 . Again subtyping can be used to establish agreement, but unlike the case with assignment statements, there are now two ways to get it. The type of e can be coerced to a higher level, or the types of the branches can be coerced to lower levels using the antimonotonicity of command types. In some situations both kinds of coercions are necessary. Observe that no coercions will lead to agreement if there is downward ow from e. The typing rule must reject the conditional in this case. So the statement is well typed, as is expected, knowing that since x and y are high variables, the implicit ow from x to y is secure. The resulting type H cmd assures us that no low variable is updated in either branch (no write down). This would permit the entire statement to be used where high information again is implicitly known. Now if (x) = L var, then the implicit ow is still secure, but establishing this fact within the type system now requires subtyping. One option is to use the antimonotonic subtyping of command types where H cmd L cmd since L H. Each branch then is coerced from type H cmd to L cmd so that we can let = L and get `if x = 1 then y := 1 else y := 0 : L cmd
On the other hand, we might coerce the type of x upward from L to H and let = H instead. Then once again the conditional has type H cmd. This would be our only choice if we had to successfully type the conditional, say, as the branch of yet another conditional whose guard is high. And nally, if (x) = H var and (y) = L var, then the conditional is not well typed, which is what we would expect since now the implicit ow is downward. Our core language includes a construct for declaring local variables. A local variable, say x, in our language is declared as letvar x := e in c
It creates x initialized with the value of expression e. The scope and lifetime of x is command c. The initialization can cause an implicit ow, but it is always harmless. Consider, for instance, the program fragment in Figure 1 , for some commands c and c 0 . If x is high and each instance of y is low, then it might appear as though the program should be rejected because there is a downward implicit ow from x to y. But if c and c 0 do not update any low variables, that is, each can be typed as high commands, then the program is actually secure, despite the downward ow. The contents of x cannot be \laundered" via y. To see this, suppose x is high. Then the rule for typing conditionals given above forces c and c 0 to be typed as high commands. By the con nement property, then, neither c nor c 0 has any assignments to low variables and thus y cannot be assigned to any low variables.
Type Soundness
We prove two interesting security lemmas for our type system, namely Simple Security and Con nement. Simple Security applies to expressions and Con nement to commands. If an expression e can be given type in our system, then Simple Security says, for secrecy, that only variables at level or lower in e will have their contents read when e is evaluated (no read up). For integrity, it says that every variable in e stores information at integrity level . On the other hand, if a command c can be given type cmd, then Con nement says, for secrecy, that no variable below level is updated in c (no write down). For integrity, it states that every variable assigned to in c can indeed be updated by information at integrity level .
These two lemmas are used to prove the type system is sound. Soundness is formulated as a kind of noninterference property. Intuitively, it says that variables in a well-typed program do not interfere with variables at lower security levels. That is, if a variable v has security level , then one can change the initial values of any variables whose security levels are not dominated by , execute the program, and the nal value of v will be the same, provided the program terminates successfully.
Type Inference
It is possible to check automatically whether a program is well typed by using standard techniques of type inference. While a detailed discussion of type inference is beyond the scope of this paper, the basic idea is to use type variables to represent A Sound Type System for Secure Flow Analysis 7 unknown types and to collect constraints (in the form of type inequalities) that the type variables must satisfy for the program to be well typed. In this way, one can construct a principal type for the program that represents all possible types that the program can be given.
A Formal Treatment of the Type System
We consider a core block-structured language described below. It consists of phrases, which are either expressions e or commands c:
(phrases) p ::= e j c (expressions) e ::= x j l j n j e + e 0 j e ? e 0 j e = e 0 j e < e 0 (commands) c ::= e := e 0 j c; c 0 j if e then c else c 0 j while e do c j letvar x := e in c Metavariable x ranges over identi ers, l over locations (addresses), and n over integer literals. Integers are the only values. We use 0 for false and 1 for true, and assume that locations are well ordered. There are no I/O primitives in the language. All I/O is done through free locations in a program. That is, if a program needs to \read input" then it does so by dereferencing an explicit location in the program. Likewise, a program that needs to \write output" does so by an assignment to an explicit location. Locations may also be created during program execution due to local variable declarations. So a partially-evaluated program may contain newly-generated locations as well as those used for I/O.
The types of the core language are strati ed as follows.
(data types) ::= s (phrase types) ::= j var j cmd Metavariable s ranges over the set SC of security classes, which is assumed to be partially ordered by . Type var is the type of a variable and cmd is the type of a command.
The typing rules for the core language are given in Figure 2 . We omit typing rules for some of the expressions since they are similar to rule (arith). Typing judgments have the form
where is a location typing and is an identi er typing. The judgment means that phrase p has type , assuming prescribes types for locations in p and prescribes types for any free identi ers in p. An identi er typing is a nite function mapping identi ers to types; (x) is the type assigned to x by . Also, x : ] is a modi ed identi er typing that assigns type to x and assigns type (x 0 ) to any identi er x 0 other than x. A location typing is a nite function mapping locations to types. The notational conventions for location typings are similar to those for identi er typings.
The remaining rules of the type system constitute the subtyping logic and are given in Figure 3 . Properties of the logic are established by the following lemmas. 
The Formal Semantics
The soundness of our type system is established with respect to a natural semantics for closed phrases in the core language. We say that a phrase is closed if it has no free identi ers. A closed phrase is evaluated relative to a memory , which is a nite function from locations to values. The contents of a location l 2 dom( ) is the value (l), and we write l := n] for the memory that assigns value n to location l, and value (l 0 ) to a location l 0 6 = l; note that l := n] is an update of if l 2 dom( ) and an extension of otherwise.
The evaluation rules are given in Figure 4 . They allow us to derive judgments of the form `e ) n for expressions and `c ) 0 for commands. These judgments assert that evaluating closed expression e in memory results in integer n and that evaluating closed command c in memory results in a new memory 0 . Note that expressions cannot cause side e ects and commands do not yield values. 
Type Soundness
We now establish the soundness of the type system with respect to the semantics of the core language. The soundness theorem states that if (l) = , for some location l, then one can arbitrarily alter the initial value of any location l 0 such Figure 3 are not included in the syntax-directed system. We shall write judgments in the syntax-directed system as ; `s p : .
The bene t of the syntax-directed system is that the last rule used in the derivation of a typing ; `s p : is uniquely determined by the form of p and of . For example, if p is a while loop, then the derivation can only end with rule (while 0 ), as opposed to (while) or (subtype) in the original system. The syntax-directed rules also suggest where a type inference algorithm should introduce coercions.
Next we establish that the syntax-directed system is actually equivalent to our original system. First we need another lemma: the syntax-directed rules (r-val 0 ), (assign 0 ), (if 0 ), or (while 0 ) can be simulated by a use of (r-val), (assign), (if), or (while), followed by a use of (subtype). For example, a use of (assign 0 )
; `e : var; ; `e 0 : ; 0 ; `e := e 0 : 0 cmd can be simulated by using (assign) to show ; `e := e 0 : cmd, using (base) and (cmd ? ) to show` cmd 0 cmd, and using (subtype) to show ; `e := e 0 : 0 cmd. Now suppose that ; `p : . We will prove that ; `s p : by induction on the height of the derivation of ; `p : .
If the derivation ends with (int), (var) or (varloc), then ; `s p : is immediate, and it follows directly by induction if the derivation ends with (arith), (compose) or (letvar).
If the derivation ends with (r-val), (assign), (if), or (while), then ; p : follows by an application of the corresponding syntax-directed rule, using the fact that is re exive.
Finally, suppose the derivation of ; `p : ends with (subtype). Then by the hypotheses of this rule, there is a type 0 such that ; `p : 0 and 0 . By induction, ; `s p : 0 . Thus, ; `s p : by Lemma 6.1. t u From now on, we shall assume that all typing derivations are done in the syntax-directed type system, and therefore shall take`to mean`s .
As nal preparation, we establish the following properties of the type system and semantics. Lemma 6.3 (Simple Security) If `e : , then for every l in e, (l) . Proof. By induction on the structure of e. Suppose `l : by rule (r-val 0 ). Then there is a type 0 such that `l : 0 var and 0 . Now (l) = 0 by rule (varloc), so (l) .
Suppose `e+e 0 : . Then `e : and `e 0 : . By two uses of induction, (l) , for every l in e, and for every l in e 0 . So (l) for every l in e + e 0 . t u Simple security applies to both secrecy and integrity. In the case of secrecy, it says that only locations at level or lower will have their contents read when e is evaluated (no read up). So if L H and = L, then e can be evaluated without reading any H locations.
In the case of integrity, it says that if e has integrity level , then every location in e stores information at integrity level . For example, if T U , where T is trusted and U untrusted, and = T , then the lemma states that every location in e stores trusted information. t u
Con nement applies to both secrecy and integrity as well. In the case of secrecy, it says that no location below level is updated in c (no write down). For integrity, it states that every location assigned to in c can indeed be updated by information at integrity level . So, for example, if = U , then the lemma says that no trusted location will be updated when c is evaluated.
The following lemma is a straightforward variant of a lemma given in 10]. Yet, the set of nal values for y when x = 0 is y = 1 and y = 2, and when x = 1 is just y = 1 because the loop does not terminate. Denning has used concepts such as uncertainty (entropy) from information theory to formalize the notion of information ow in programs 8]. Basically, if a program, executed in state s, yields a state s 0 , then the execution causes an information ow from x to y if new information about x in state s is available from y in state s 0 . In other words, we are more certain about the contents of x knowing y after execution than knowing y before. In this setting, soundness seems to require an information-theoretic characterization. It is unclear how such a characterization could be proved with respect to a standard programming language semantics. Such a semantics does not make explicit notions like uncertainty. We have demonstrated that it is possible to formulate and prove soundness without resorting to information theory to get a handle on intuitive ideas like information ow. All that one needs to know about what kind of security is guaranteed by our type system is captured entirely by the type soundness theorem.
Core Language Extensions
The core language we consider has been kept simple, perhaps even emasculate, to better explain our basic proof technique. Although one can imagine many ways to extend the language, there is an obligation to also extend the type system and to prove that well-typed programs preserve the security properties of interest. Other language features pose more serious problems for our type soundness theorem. One is the idea of explicit type casting within programs. Palsberg and rb k 19] propose a system for integrity analysis in programs. They introduce a cast operator called trust that can be used to explicitly coerce an untrusted value to a trusted value. (Note that the opposite coercion, from trusted to untrusted, can always be made implicitly, since T U .) While such a coercion seems useful pragmatically, including it in the language rules out our type soundness theorem. It seems quite di cult to characterize what is being guaranteed by the ow analysis with such a coercion. Another source of di culty is the proper treatment of nondeterminism. Observe, for instance, that if we try to extend the core language with a primitive random number generator rand( ) and allow an assignment such as z := rand( ) to be well typed when z is low, then the soundness theorem no longer holds. (Executing this assignment twice from the same memory may produce di erent nal values for z.) A weakness of traditional noninterference is that it is unable to model security in nondeterministic systems 13] 14]. So perhaps it is not surprising that nondeterministic language features also cause a problem. As mentioned above, Banâtre et al. encountered di culty when attempting to prove a form of noninterference for nondeterministic programs. New security models, such as Generalized Noninterference 12] should be explored as potential notions of type soundness for new type systems that deal with nondeterministic programs.
Summary
We have formulated Denning's secure ow analysis as a type system and proved it sound with respect to a standard programming language semantics for a core deterministic language. The type system cleanly separates the speci cation of secure ow analysis from its implementation. We expect the core language and type system to serve as a basis for provably-secure programming languages.
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